@booklet {sergiuhart-mrwmgnaoo2012,
	title = {Maximal Revenue with Multiple Goods: Nonmonotonicity and Other Observations},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {2012},
	month = {11},
	publisher = {Thoretical Economics},
	abstract = {Consider the problem of maximizing the revenue from selling a number of goods to a single buyer. We show that, unlike the case of one good, when the buyer{\textquoteright}s values for the goods increase the seller{\textquoteright}s maximal revenue may well decrease. We also provide a characterization of revenue-maximizing mechanisms (more generally, of "seller-favorable" mechanisms) that circumvents nondifferentiability issues. Finally, through simple and transparent examples, we clarify the need for and the use of randomization when maximizing revenue in the multiple-goods versus the one-good case.},
	url = {/files/Paper},
	author = {Sergiu Hart, Philip J. Reny}
}
