@booklet {procaccia-metv2007,
	title = {Mediators Enable Truthful Voting},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {2007},
	month = {4},
	abstract = {The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem asserts the impossibility of designing a non-dictatorial voting rule in which truth-telling always constitutes a Nash equilibrium. We show that in voting games of complete information where a mediator is on hand, this troubling impossibility result can be alleviated. Indeed, we characterize families of voting rules where, given a mediator, truthful preference revelation is always in strong equilibrium. In particular, we observe that the family of feasible elimination procedures has the foregoing property.},
	url = {/files/db451.pdf},
	author = {Procaccia, Bezalel Peleg and Ariel D.}
}
