@booklet {peters-ncroeftlm2005,
	title = {Nash Consistent Representation of Effectivity Functions Through Lottery Models},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {2005},
	month = {9},
	publisher = {Games and Economic Behavior 65 (2009), 503-515.},
	abstract = {Effectivity functions for finitely many players and alternatives are considered. It is shown that every monotonic and superadditive effectivity function can be augmented with equal chance lotteries to a finite lottery model - i.e., an effectivity function that preserves the original effectivity in terms of supports of lotteries - which has a Nash consistent representation. In other words, there exists a finite game form which represents the lottery model and which has a Nash equilibrium for any profile of utility functions, where lotteries are evaluated by their expected utility. No additional condition on the original effectivity function is needed.},
	url = {/files/db404.pdf},
	author = {Peters, Bezalel Peleg and Hans}
}
