@booklet {zamir-obestcjttdc2009,
	title = {On Bayesian-Nash Equilibria Satisfying the Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {2009},
	month = {12},
	publisher = {Forthcoming in Social Choice and Welfare},
	abstract = {We investigate sufficient conditions for the existence of Bayesian-Nash equilibria that satisfy the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT). In the Bayesian game Gn among n jurors, we allow for arbitrary distribution on the types of jurors. In particular, any kind of dependency is possible. If each juror i has a constant strategy , si (that is, a strategy that is independent of the size n{\textquoteright}{\textquoteright}{\textquoteright}{\textquoteright}{\textyen}i of the jury), such that s=( s1, s2, . . . , sn . . .) satisfies theCJT, then byMcLennan (1998) there exists a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium that also satisfies the CJT. We translate the CJT condition on sequences of constant strategies into the following problem: (**) For a given sequence of binary random variables X = (X1, X2, ..., Xn, ...) with joint distribution P, does the distribution P satisfy the asymptotic part of the CJT ? We provide sufficient conditions and two general (distinct) necessary conditions for (**). We give a complete solution to this problem when X is a sequence of exchangeable binary random variables.},
	url = {/files/db527.pdf},
	author = {Zamir, Bezalel Peleg and Shmuel}
}
