@booklet {winter-oraabo2000,
	title = {On Risk Aversion and Bargaining Outcomes},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {2000},
	month = {3},
	publisher = {Games and Economic Behavior 41 (2002), 120-140.},
	abstract = {We revisit the well-known result that asserts that an increase in the degree of one{\textquoteright}s risk aversion improves the position of one{\textquoteright}s opponents. To this end, we apply Yaari{\textquoteright}s dual theory of choice under risk both to Nash{\textquoteright}s bargaining problem and to Rubinstein{\textquoteright}s game of alternating offers. Under this theory, unlike under expected utility, risk aversion influences the bargaining outcome only when this outcome is random, namely, when the players are risk-lovers. In this case, an increase in one{\textquoteright}s degree of risk aversion increases one{\textquoteright}s share of the pie.},
	url = {/files/dp214.pdf},
	author = {Winter, Oscar Volij and Eyal}
}
