@booklet {neeman-otgofseimd2004,
	title = {On the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {2004},
	month = {2},
	publisher = {Econometrica 74 (2006), 213-233},
	abstract = {A number of studies, most notably Cr{\texttimes}mer and McLean (1985, 1988), have shown that in Harsanyi type spaces of a fixed finite size, it is generically possible to design mechanisms that extract all the surplus~ from players, and as a consequence, implement any outcome as if the players{\textquoteright} private information~ were commonly known. In contrast, we show that within the set of common priors on the universal type~ space, the subset of priors that permit the extraction of the players{\textquoteright} full surplus is shy. Shyness is a~ notion of smallness for convex subsets of infinite-dimensional topological vector spaces (in our case,~ the set of common priors), which generalizes the usual notion of zero Lebesgue measure in~ finite-dimensional spaces.},
	url = {/files/dp350.pdf},
	author = {Neeman, Aviad Heifetz and Zvika}
}
