@booklet {runemidjord-oolcoe2013,
	title = {Over-Caution of Large Committees of Experts},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {2013},
	month = {12},
	abstract = {In this paper, we demonstrate that payoffs linked to a committee member{\textquoteright}s individual vote may explain over-cautious behavior in committees. A committee of experts must decide whether to approve or reject a proposed innovation on behalf of society. In addition to a payoff linked to the adequateness of the committee{\textquoteright}s decision, each expert receives a disesteem payoff if he/she voted in favor of an ill-fated innovation. An example is FDA committees, where committee members can be exposed to a disesteem (negative) payoff if they vote to pass a drug that proves to be fatal for some users. We show that no matter how small the disesteem payoffs are, information aggregation fails in large committees: under any majority rule, the committee rejects the innovation almost surely. We then show that this inefficiency can be mitigated by pre-vote information pooling, but only if the decision is take under unanimity: in the presence of disesteem payoffs, committee members will only vote efficiently if they are all responsible for the final decision.},
	url = {/files/dp654.pdf},
	author = {Rune Midjord, Tom s Rodr �guez-Barraquer, Justin Valasek}
}
