@booklet {brunobassan-pvoiig2002,
	title = {Positive Value of Information in Games},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {2002},
	month = {8},
	publisher = {International Journal of Game Theory 32 (2003), 17-31},
	abstract = {We exhibit a general class of interactive decision situations in which all the agents benefit from more information. This class includes as a special case the classical comparison of statistical experiments ~ la Blackwell.More specifically, we consider pairs consisting of a game with incomplete information G and an information structure S such that the extended game {\textquotedblleft}(G,S) has a unique Pareto payoff profile u. We prove that u is a Nash payoff profile of {\textquotedblleft}(G,S), and that for any information structure that is coarser than S, all Nash payoff profiles of {\textquotedblleft}(G,T) are dominated by u. We then prove that our condition is also necessary in the following sense: Given any convex compact polyhedron of payoff profiles, whose Pareto frontier is not a singleton, there exists an extended game {\textquotedblleft}(G,S) with that polyhedron as the convex hull of feasible payoffs, an information structure T coarser than S and a player i who strictly prefers a Nash equilibrium in {\textquotedblleft}(G,T) to any Nash equilibrium in {\textquotedblleft}(G,S).},
	url = {/files/dp294.pdf},
	author = {Bruno Bassan, Olivier Gossner, Marco Scarsini and Shmuel Zamir}
}
