@booklet {peleg-roeficpneacc2000,
	title = {Representation of Effectivity Functions in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium: A Complete Characterization},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {2000},
	month = {8},
	publisher = {Social Choice and Welfare 19 (2002), 241-263},
	abstract = {The concept of coalition proof Nash equilibrium was introduced by Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston. In the present paper, we consider the representation problem for coalition proof Nash equilibrium: For a given effectivity function, describing the power structure or the system of rights of coalitions in society, it is investigated whether there is a game form which gives rise to this effectivity function and which is such that for any preference assignment, there is a coalition proof Nash equilibrium. It is shown that the effectivity functions which can be represented in coalition proof Nash equilibrium are exactly those which satisfy the well-known properties of maximality and superadditivity. As a corollary of the result, we obtain necessary conditions for implementation of a social choice correspondence in coalition proof Nash equilibrium which can be formulated in terms of the associated effectivity function.},
	url = {/files/dp223.pdf},
	author = {Peleg, Hans Keiding and Bezalel}
}
