@booklet {bezalelpeleg-sosccise2018,
	title = {Self-Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences in Strong Equilibrium},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {2018},
	month = {4},
	abstract = {A social choice correspondence is self-implementable in strong equilibrium if it is implementable in strong equilibrium by a social choice function selecting from the correspondence itself as a game form. We characterize all social choice correspondences implementable this way by an anonymous social choice function satisfying no veto power, given that the number of agents is large relative to the number of alternatives. It turns out that these are exactly the social choice correspondences resulting from feasible elimination procedures as introduced in Peleg (1978).},
	url = {/files/dp717.pdf},
	author = {Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters}
}
