@booklet {winter-ssmfepg1999,
	title = {Simple Subscription Mechanisms for Excludable Public Goods},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {1999},
	month = {6},
	publisher = {Journal of Economic Theory 1 (1999), 72-94.},
	abstract = {For excludable public goods, we propose simple mechanisms to uniquely implement a (core) stable and efficient production and cost-sharing outcome: consumers are asked to announce sequentially their minimal requested level of public good and a subscription towards its production. In one mechanism the subscriptions are order-independent and thus symmetric. The equilibrium outcomes induced by our mechanisms are immune to strategic deviations by coalitions. Keywords: Excludable public good, demand-subscription mechanism, implementation, stand alone core, coalition formation, strong equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: H41, C72, D78.},
	url = {/files/dp199.pdf},
	author = {Winter, Parimal Kanti Bag and Eyal}
}
