@booklet {rosenthal-saws1995,
	title = {Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {1995},
	month = {3},
	abstract = {Motivated by recent auctions of licenses for the radio-frequency spectrum, we consider situations where multiple objects are auctioned simultaneously by means of a second-price, sealed-bid auction. For some buyers, called global bidders, the value of multiple objects exceeds the sum of objects{\textquoteright} values separately. Others, called local bidders, are interested in only one object. In a simple independent private values setting, we (a) characterize an equilibrium that is symmetric among the global bidders; (b) show that the addition of bidders often leads to less aggressive bidding; and (c) compare the revenues obtained from the simultaneous auction to those from its sequential counterpart.},
	url = {/files/dp75.pdf},
	author = {Rosenthal, Vijay Krishna and Robert W.}
}
