@booklet {peretz-tsvor2007,
	title = {Strategic Value of Recall, The},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {2007},
	month = {11},
	abstract = {This work studies the value of two-person zero-sum repeated games in which at least one of the players is restricted to (mixtures of) bounded recall strategies. A (pure) k-recall strategy is a strategy that relies only on the last k periods of history. This work improves previous results [Lehrer, Neyman and Okada] on repeated games with bounded recall. We provide an explicit formula for the asymptotic value of the repeated game as a function of the stage game, the duration of the repeated game, and the recall of the agents.},
	url = {/files/dp470.pdf},
	author = {Ron Peretz}
}
