@booklet {peleg-sasceatdoteobcwar1992,
	title = {Strict and Symmetric Correlated Equilibria Are the Distributions of the ESS{\textquoteright}s of Biological Conflicts with Asymmetric Roles},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {1992},
	month = {8},
	publisher = {In W. Albers, W. Guth, P. Hammerstein, B. Moldovanu \&amp; E. van Damme (eds.), Understanding Strategic Interaction, Essays in Honor of R. Selten, (1997) Springer-Verlag 149-170},
	abstract = {We investigate the ESS{\textquoteright}s of payoff-irrelevant asymmetric animal conflicts in Selten{\textquoteright}s (1980) model. We show that these are determined by the symmetric and strict correlated equilibria of the underlying (symmetric) two-person game. More precisely, the set of distributions (on the strategy space) of ESS{\textquoteright}s coincides with the set of strict and symmetric correlated equilibria (described as distributions). Our result enables us to predict all possible stable payoffs in payoff-irrelevant asymmetric animal conflicts using Aumann{\textquoteright}s correlated equilibria. Italso enables us to interpret correlated equilibria as solutions to biological conflicts: Nature supplies the correlation device as a phenotypic conditional behavior.},
	url = {{\textquoteright}},
	author = {Peleg, Avi Shmida and Bezalel}
}
