@booklet {dansfelsenthal-tvg1996,
	title = {Ternary Voting Games},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {1996},
	month = {2},
	publisher = {International Journal of Game Theory 26 (1997), 335-351},
	abstract = {We define ternary voting games (TVGs), a generalization of simple voting games (SVGs). In a play of an SVG each voter has just two options: voting {\textquoteleft}yes{\textquoteright} or {\textquoteleft}no{\textquoteright}. In a TVG a third option is added: abstention. Every SVG can be regarded as a (somewhat degenerate) TVG; but the converse is false. We define appropriate generalizations of the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices for TVGs. We define also the responsiveness (or degree of democratic participation) of a TVG and determine, for each n, the most responsive TVGs with n voters. We show that these maximally responsive TVGs are more responsive than the corresponding SVGs.},
	url = {/files/dp98.pdf},
	author = {Dan S. Felsenthal, Moshe Machover}
}
