@booklet {volij-ueisbaatdtocur1999,
	title = {Utility Equivalence in Sealed Bid Auctions and the Dual Theory of Choice Under Risk},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {1999},
	month = {3},
	abstract = {This paper analyzes symmetric, single item auctions in the private values framework, with buyers whose preferences satisfy the axioms of Yaari{\textquoteright}s (1987) dual theory of choice under risk. It is shown that when their valuations are independently and identically distributed, buyers are indifferent among all the auctions contained in a big family of mechanisms that includes the standard auctions. It is also shown that in the linear equilibria of the sealed bid double auction, as the degree of players{\textquoteright} risk aversion grows arbitrarily large, the ex post inefficiency of the mechanism tends to vanish. JEL Classification Numbers: D44; D81},
	url = {/files/dp193.pdf},
	author = {Volij, Oscar}
}
