@booklet {winter-vav1994,
	title = {Voting and Vetoing},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {1994},
	month = {6},
	publisher = {American Political Science Review 90 (1996), 813-823},
	abstract = {The consequences of veto power in committees is analyzed using the approach of non-cooperative bargaining theory. It is first shown that in equilibrium non-veto players do not share in the benefits gained by the decision making of the committee, i.e, in every equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game non-veto players earn zero. Some measures for reducing the excessive power of veto members in committees are analyzed. Specifically, we study the effects of imposing a deadline on negotiations and of expanding the committee by increasing the number of non-veto players.},
	url = {/files/dp49.pdf},
	author = {Winter, Eyal}
}
