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by

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Discussion Paper # 423 May 2006

מרכז לחקר הרציונליות

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Decision Framing and Support for Concessions in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*

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Abstract

The purpose of the study is to explore, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the influence of framing a decision task as inclusion or exclusion on Israeli-Jewish respondents' support for the concession of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. Respondents received a list of 40 Jewish settlements. Details such as the number of residents and geographical location were provided for each settlement. The respondents were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the inclusion condition 55 respondents were asked to mark the settlements for which they recommended that Israeli sovereignty be *conceded*. In the exclusion condition 53 respondents were asked to mark the settlements for which they recommended that Israeli sovereignty *not* be *conceded*.

The findings confirm the predictions tested and indicate that: (1) Framing the task in terms of inclusion or exclusion affects respondents' support for territorial compromise, so that respondents in the exclusion condition support the concession of more settlements than respondents in the inclusion condition. (2) Framing the task in terms of inclusion or exclusion has a greater effect on support for conceding options (settlements) that are perceived as ambiguous (less consensual in the climate of opinion) in comparison to options (settlements) that are perceived as more clear-cut (more consensual). The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.

* The research was supported by Grants from the Smart Communications Institute and from the Minerva Center for Human Rights, both at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem to the first author and by Grants Nos. 822/00 (2000-2003) and 344/05 (2005-2008) from the Israel Science Foundation to the second author. Portions of this work were reported in a masters' thesis submitted by Naama Ivri to the Department of Psychology. Please address correspondence to Ifat Maoz, Department of Communications, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem 91905, Israel, Email: <u>msifat@mscc.huji.ac.il</u> or to Ilan Yaniv at <u>ilan.yaniv@huji.ac.il</u>. The data used in this article can be found at http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets.

Introduction

Violent ethnopolitical conflicts are a major problem of our times, taking human lives as well as having material costs. Some of these conflicts, such as the ones in Northern Ireland and Cyprus and the Israeli-Palestinian one, are deeply rooted, protracted and intractable. These conflicts have lasted for a several decades and involve issues with existential implications that are deeply controversial for both parties (Bar-Tal, 1998, 2000, 2001; Coleman, 2003; Kelman, 1998; 1999).

Willingness to Compromise in Conflict

One of the prominent obstacles to the resolution of such protracted conflicts is the unwillingness of the parties to compromise (Bar-On, 1997; Bar-Tal, 2000, Kelman, 1999). Researchers have tried to locate factors and mechanisms that influence parties' readiness for making concessions in conflicts. These include strategic considerations such as *playing it tough* or *not giving in too easily* (Ross, 1995), as well as attitudes and emotions towards the other side (Bar-Tal, 2001; Maoz & McCauley, 2005).

In this context, a series of studies based on public opinion surveys of the Jewish-Israeli population investigated intergroup attitudes that influence people's support for certain compromise solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Maoz & McCauley, 2005). In line with other studies of Jewish attitudes in this conflict (Bar-Tal, 2001; Gordon & Arian, 2001), this research (Maoz & McCauley, 2005) found that a major factor decreasing Israeli Jews' support for compromise is their perception of a collective Palestinian threat to harm Israelis and destroy Israel. Additional psychological factors such as hostility and perception of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a zero-sum game – where there is no solution that is good for both sides, and anything that is beneficial to one side is necessarily bad for the other – further reduced Israelis' support for compromise solutions, while sympathy towards Palestinians significantly increased their support for compromise (Maoz & McCauley, 2005).

A growing body of research shows that decision framing affects our tendency to cooperate and make concessions in conflict and negotiation (Bazerman & Neale, 1993; Thompson, 1995; Geva, D'Astorino-Courtois & Mintz, 1996). For example, negotiators who frame their outcomes as losses, and for whom compromises represent escalating losses, show less tendency to compromise (due to loss aversion, Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), than those who frame their outcomes as gains (Mnookin & Ross, 1995; Bazerman & Neale, 1993).

The present study focuses on a specific decision framing effect – the exclusion- inclusion discrepancy (Yaniv & Schul, 1997; 2000) -- and investigates its influence on support for concessions in the realistic context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Specifically, it investigates

the effect of framing a decision task as inclusion versus exclusion on the extent to which Israeli-Jews support the concession of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza.

The inclusion-exclusion discrepancy

Consider the task of reducing a large set of viable options to a smaller subset. One could proceed by eliminating the unfavorable options from the list, thereby retaining the favorable ones. Alternatively, one could select the favorable ones from the list. For example, editorial decisions can be framed in two ways. An acceptance strategy implies that papers are accepted only if they are good enough. An elimination strategy implies that manuscripts are rejected only if they are not good enough; otherwise they are accepted. As it turns out, the two judgment modes or frames – inclusion and exclusion – do not necessarily lead to the same outcome.

Previous work has shown that a given option has a substantially greater chance of being retained in the final set if exclusion rather than inclusion is used (Levin, Jasper, & Forbes, 1998; Yaniv & Schul, 1997, 2000). This finding is referred to as the inclusion-exclusion discrepancy. The effect implies that a given paper has a greater chance of being published if the editor's decision mode is exclusion rather than inclusion.

In a study demonstrating this phenomenon, Yaniv and Schul (2000) contrasted the inclusion and exclusion choice procedures in a task that simulated career decision making. They presented participants with a series of personality vignettes, each describing an individual consultee, her or his inclinations, abilities, fields of interest, and so on. Each vignette was presented together with a list of (12 to 36) alternative occupations of varying degrees of fit with the consultee's profile (e.g., social worker, probation officer, travel agent, nurse, and optometrist), derived from earlier research on vocational decision making (Gati, 1994). Participants in the inclusion condition were asked to mark the options (occupations) that fit the person described. Participants in the exclusion condition were asked to mark the options that did not fit the person's profile. The measured variable in this study was the size of the choice set expressed as a percentage of the options presented in the original set.

The results revealed a substantial discrepancy between the inclusion and exclusion outcomes. While 50% of the occupations were retained in the choice set under exclusion, only 27% were retained under inclusion (Yaniv & Schul, 2000, Study 1). In other words, the probability that a given option would be retained in the choice set was larger under exclusion than under inclusion. Evidence for an inclusion-exclusion discrepancy of this sort was also found in studies that involved general-knowledge questions (Yaniv & Schul, 1997), prediction of election results (Yaniv et al., 2002), files of job candidates (Huber, Neale & Northcraft, 1987), cars (Levin,

Jasper, & Forbes, 1998), schools (Levin, Huenke, & Jasper, 2000), and journal articles (Westenberg & Koele, 1992).

The theoretical explanation suggested for this phenomenon is that inclusion and exclusion assume different default (status quo) positions. An inclusion frame implies that options are accepted only if they are good enough, otherwise they are left out, by default). An exclusion frame implies that options are rejected only if they are proven to be not good enough, otherwise they are accepted, by default. Certain options may be neither included nor excluded since there is neither enough evidence to include them nor sufficient evidence to exclude them. Therefore, they are not necessarily complementary (for further detail and discussion of the related findings by Shafir, 1993, see Yaniv & Schul, 2000; Yaniv et al., 2002).

Inclusion-Exclusion and Making Concessions

Consider again the example of the journal editor for whom the inclusion-exclusion discrepancy may affect the number of papers she eventually chooses to retain in her journal. Task framing may influence the number of papers she is willing to concede or give up out of a set number of papers that were sent to her for publication. Though it seems reasonable to assume that inclusionexclusion framing affects the number of concessions we are willing to make, such an implication of this effect has not been directly investigated empirically. In the present study our objective was to investigate the implications of the inclusion-exclusion discrepancy for making concessions in negotiations. Specifically, we sought to determine if this discrepancy has an effect on the number of settlements Israeli Jews would agree to conceding in peace negotiations with the Palestinians.

Respondents were given a list of the names of 40 settlements situated in the West Bank and Gaza. In one condition they were asked to indicate which of these settlements they would agree to concede. In the other condition they were asked to indicate which of them they would not agree to concede. Based on previous studies of the inclusion-exclusion discrepancy (Yaniv & Schul, 1997) and on our above reasoning regarding the possible extension of this discrepancy to concession-making situations, we predicted that respondents would agree to concede a larger number of settlements under the exclusion condition.

However, as in many other cognitive or judgmental biases, we can expect this framing effect to be stronger in ambiguous or ambivalent situations that involve a high level of uncertainty and weaker in clear-cut situations in which people have definite preferences to base their judgment on (Maoz et al., 2002; Trope, Cohen, & Maoz, 1988). Below we discuss the important role of ambiguity about the options (in our case, settlements) to be conceded.

Ambiguous vs. Clear-cut Options

Past studies have found that the inclusion-exclusion discrepancy depends on the ambiguity of the options. For each option people can recruit reasons – pros and cons – for it to be included (or excluded). For some options the balance of pros and cons is lopsided. We call them clear-cut. For other options the balance of pros and cons is ambiguous rather than clear-cut and we call them 'middling' or ambiguous. We suggest that the fate of the clear-cut options is less dependent on the choice procedure. They are either placed inside the choice set by both procedures or left outside by both procedures. However, the fate of the middling options is highly dependent on the choice procedure – whether they are inside or outside the choice set depends on the decision frame (Yaniv et al., 2002).

As an illustration, a superb paper is likely to end up in the journal, regardless of whether the choice procedure is inclusion or exclusion. Similarly, a very poor paper is likely to end up outside, regardless of whether the editor takes one approach or the other. However, the fate of a paper of intermediate quality is more likely to depend on the dominant decision frame. Under an *inclusion* frame, the editor would consider the strength of the reasons to accept the paper. An intermediate paper might not be included for lack of sufficient reasons to do so, thus it would remain 'out' (i.e., rejected). Under an *exclusion* frame however, the editor would consider the strength of the reasons to exclude it. An intermediate paper might not be rejected for lack of reasons to do so, thus it would remain 'in' (i.e., accepted). In sum, the fate of ambiguous options is especially dependent on the dominant decision frame.

In a similar way, there is a considerable consensus about some settlements that they should (or should not) be part of Israel. These are considered as clear-cut (i.e., less ambiguous) options. Consider, for example, a large settlement on the outskirts of Jerusalem for which there is great consensus by Israeli Jews that it should remain under Israeli sovereignty. Such a settlement might be perceived by the individual respondent as a clear-cut case that would not be given up under either elicitation procedure (inclusion or exclusion). In contrast, the fate of an ambiguous settlement about which opinions are divided (no consensus) would be more dependent on the elicitation procedure.

Overview of the Present Study

Respondents received a list of 40 Jewish settlements located in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Respondents in the inclusion condition were asked to indicate for which settlements they would agree to conceding Israeli sovereignty. Respondents in the exclusion condition were asked for which settlements they would *not* agree to conceding Israeli sovereignty. In line with previous studies of the exclusion-inclusion framing effect, we hypothesized first that the choice set in the exclusion condition would be larger than the one in the inclusion condition; therefore, respondents would agree to concede Israeli sovereignty for more settlements in the exclusion than in the inclusion condition. Second, based on the theoretical analysis above, we hypothesized that the exclusion-inclusion effect would be greater for ambiguous or middling cases (settlements) than for clear-cut ones.

Method

Respondents

Respondents were 108 Jewish-Israeli students from a large Israeli university. Of these respondents 38% rated their political attitude as dovish, 40% rated it as hawkish and the remaining 22% rated it as centrist. Respondents were randomly assigned to the two experimental conditions, so that each experimental group included approximately half the sample.

Research Design

The research design was two-factorial. The first factor, *decision frame*, was manipulated among respondents. It included two conditions: (1) 'Concede', in which respondents were asked to mark the settlements in which they recommended that Israeli sovereignty be conceded, and (2) 'Not concede', in which respondents were asked to mark the settlements for which they recommended that Israeli sovereignty should not be conceded. The second factor, *settlement type*, which was investigated within respondents, included two categories: clear-cut versus ambiguous cases.

The dependent variable was the percentage of settlements recommended for concession by each respondent in each of the experimental conditions and for each settlement type. That is, the percentage of settlements marked in the 'concede' condition or the percentage of settlements left unmarked in the 'not concede' condition.

Procedure and Materials

Respondents filled out the research questionnaire individually and separately in a classroom. They were paid or given class credit for their participation. At the outset, they read instructions telling them that the questionnaire they would be given was about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and that they would be asked to express their opinions about the fate of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

They were presented with a list of 40 Jewish settlements in the West bank and Gaza strip. For each settlement information was given regarding the area in which it is located (i.e., Samaria, the Gaza shore, Gush Etzion), the number of its residents, and an identifying number to help locate it on a map attached to the questionnaire. The map showed Israel, the Palestinian Authority and the bordering states. It included the names of major Israeli and Palestinian cities, and the identifying numbers of the 40 settlements.

Respondents in the 'concede' condition (n=55) were instructed to indicate the settlements for which they recommended giving up Israeli sovereignty. Respondents in the 'not concede' condition (n= 53) were asked to indicate the settlements for which they recommended not giving up Israeli sovereignty. Respondents were not limited in the number of settlements that they could mark. They were told that they could mark anywhere between 0 and 40 settlements. Respondents indicated their judgments by circling the names of settlements on the list, according to the experimental condition they were assigned to.

Construction of the List of Settlements

The list of 40 settlements presented to the respondents was based on the full "List of settlements in the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip" compiled by the Israeli office of Interior Affairs and updated to December 2000. This list included 145 settlements, grouped according to the local council they were part of. The list of the settlements presented to the respondents was constructed by sampling a number of settlements from each local authority; the number was proportionate to the total number of settlements in that authority. In addition, the settlements sampled from each locality were heterogeneous in size (number of residents), so that settlements of varying size were sampled in each locality.

Clear-cut and Ambiguous Settlements. We classified the 40 settlements into two equal types: clearcut and ambiguous. The classification was done on the basis of data from a separate questionnaire filled out by an independent group of respondents (n= 51) who were run at the same time of the main study (May 2002), and who were asked to indicate, on exactly the same list of settlements as in the main study, whether or not each of the settlements should be part of Israel. The clear-cut group included 20 settlements that enjoy the highest consensus. Half of this group (ten out of 20) were settlements that a high percentage of respondents thought should be part of Israel (e.g., 84% of the respondents agreed about Maaleh Edomim and 82% agreed about Ariel); the remaining half were settlements that a high percentage of respondents thought should *not* be part of Israel (82% agreement about Morag, 80% about Kfar Darom). The ambiguous group included 20 settlements for which these respondents expressed less consensus about their being part of Israel (51% agreement about Psagot, 53% about Shilo and 55% about Miztpeh Shalem). Clearly the difference between the clear-cut and ambiguous types according to the consensus results is not a large one and is a matter of degree rather than a qualitative difference, so that more appropriate labels for describing the two groups would be 'less ambiguous' and 'more ambiguous', respectively.

Results

To test the research hypotheses, a two-factor analysis of variance was performed in which the framing of the decision task ('concede' vs. 'not concede') was tested between subjects, and settlement type (ambiguous vs. clear-cut) was tested as a within-subjects factor. The dependent variable was the percentage of settlements the respondents were willing to concede as a function of decision frame and settlement type (i.e., the percentage of settlements marked in the 'concede' condition or the percentage of settlements left unmarked in the 'not concede' condition.)

The results appear in Table I below. Before discussing our specific hypotheses, we note the high standard deviations in each of the different framing conditions (around 30% in each cell). This variability in the respondents' opinions indicates how divisive this topic was (e.g., a few respondents indicated that *no* settlements should be conceded, while a few others indicated that *all* the settlements should be conceded.)

Table I. Percentage of Settlements Participants Were Willing to Concede (and Standard

Decision Frame	Inclusion ('concede')	Exclusion ('not concede')	Discrepancy
Clear-cut	35.1%	54.9%	20.2%
	(30.9%)	(33.1%)	
Ambiguous	31.9%	58.6%	26.7%
	(33.8%)	(36.8%)	

Deviations) as a Function of Decision Frame and Settlement Type

Testing Hypothesis 1

Our results confirmed Hypothesis 1 (see Table I). A main effect was found for the framing of the decision task. As expected, the size of the choice set, i.e. the number of settlements respondents agreed to concede, was significantly larger in the 'not concede' condition than in the 'concede' condition, F(1, 106) = 13.41, p < .001. These results indicate a substantial discrepancy between the two decision modes. The group addressed in exclusion terms recommended conceding more settlements than the group addressed in inclusion terms (average difference of roughly 24%). The data in Table I indicate that this inclusion-exclusion discrepancy exists for both categories of

settlements. Thus, a larger percentage of the clear-cut settlements, regarding which there is a more consensual climate of opinion, is conceded in the 'not concede' than in the 'concede' framing (top row in the table), and the same is true for the ambiguous settlements, regarding which there is a more ambivalent climate of opinion (bottom row in Table I).

Testing Hypothesis 2

Our results also confirmed Hypothesis 2. An interaction was found between the framing of the decision and the level of the settlement type, F (1, 106) = 6.53, p < .05. The data in Table I show that, as predicted, the inclusion-exclusion discrepancy was larger for the ambiguous settlements than for the clear-cut ones.

We theorize that under the inclusion frame respondents had to consider (implicitly) the reasons for *conceding* each alternative. Thus, they indicated fewer ambiguous settlements than clear-cut ones (31.9% vs 35.1%, t(54)=1.78, p<.05, one tail) since presumably it was more difficult for them to find reasons for conceding ambiguous alternatives. In the exclusion frame respondents had to consider (implicitly) the reasons for *not conceding* each alternative. Again, they indicated fewer ambiguous settlements than clear-cut ones since it was more difficult for them to find reasons for not conceding ambiguous ones. Under the 'not concede' frame they marked 45.1% of the clear-cut settlements and 41.4% of the ambiguous settlements. Thus the complementary percentages shown in the table were 54.9% and 58.6%, respectively, t(52)=1.83, p<.05, one tail. In sum, the greater framing effect for the ambiguous-type settlements (than for the clear-cut ones) is consistent with previous studies which have also shown that the fate of the more ambiguous options is more dependent on framing than is the fate of the less ambiguous options (Yaniv et al., 2002).

[Table I in here]

Discussion

This study investigated, in the realistic context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the effect of differential framing of a decision task – as inclusion or exclusion - on Israeli Jews' willingness to agree to territorial concessions in the West Bank and Gaza. Specifically, in the inclusion condition we asked Israeli Jews about the settlements for which they *would recommend* conceding Israeli sovereignty, out of a list of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In the exclusion condition we asked our respondents to indicate the settlements for which they *would not* recommend conceding sovereignty, from the same list of settlements.

The Effect of Inclusion-Exclusion Framing on Support for Concessions

As expected, we found that Israeli Jews agreed to concede a significantly larger number of settlements when asked to choose the settlements they would *not* concede (exclusion condition) than when asked to indicate the ones they *would* concede (inclusion condition). This finding is consistent with previous work that has shown that a given option has a much greater chance of being retained in the final choice set if exclusion rather than inclusion terms are used. This inclusion-exclusion discrepancy has been found in various domains, such as simulated career decision making (Yaniv & Schul, 2000), general knowledge questions (Yaniv & Schul, 1997), choice of job candidates (Huber, Neale & Northcraft, 1987), and prediction of election results (Yaniv et al., 2002).

However, while these previous studies involved remote or impersonal choices, this study demonstrates a dramatic effect of inclusion-exclusion framing on respondents' willingness to concede high-profile assets that they own (at a group level), assets they are attached to in various concrete, emotional and symbolic ways. It would be interesting to investigate in future studies how this inclusion-exclusion framing affects, interacts with, or sets limits on other ownership-related framing effects – such as the endowment effect and loss aversion (Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1991).

Our study also reveals a stronger inclusion-exclusion framing effect with ambiguous options than with less ambiguous ones. Some options are ambiguous because people have mixed feelings about them or conflicting reasons for favoring or not favoring them. In contrast, some options are unambiguous (or at least, less ambiguous), as they are clearly favorable or clearly unfavorable. The present findings suggest that the discrepancy arises to a greater extent for ambiguous than clear-cut cases (settlements, in this case). In other words, issues or options about which there is higher consensus are less susceptible to framing. This result is consistent with previous findings that specifically show that the inclusion-exclusion discrepancy is greater for ambiguous or middling choice options (Yaniv et al., 2002). Our findings are also consistent with work in the more general domain of social perception demonstrating that framing and perceptual biases tend to arise more under ambiguous than under clear-cut conditions (Trope, Cohen & Maoz, 1988; Maoz et al., 2002).

Contribution to the Study of Conflict

Perhaps more important is our demonstration of how decision framing phenomena may be applied to the realm of conflict and conflict resolution. While the inclusion-exclusion discrepancy has been demonstrated in several, non- conflict-related domains of human behavior (Yaniv & Schul, 1997; 2000), our study is innovative in showing that this discrepancy operates in a realistic, ongoing,

protracted conflict such as the Israeli-Palestinian one, and influences the sides' willingness to make concessions to the opponent.

The willingness of parties in a conflict to make concessions is often a crucial factor determining the possibility of resolving the conflict and achieving peace. One of the major barriers to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the unwillingness of the parties to make such concessions (Bar-Tal, 2001; Kelman, 1999). In this respect, our study extends previous studies that have examined psychological mechanisms influencing peoples' willingness to make concessions in protracted conflicts such as the Israeli-Arab one (Geva, D'Astorino-Courtois & Mintz, 1996, Maoz & McCauley, 2005).

Specifically, one such series of experimental studies demonstrated a reactive devaluation effect (Ross, 1995; Ross & Stillinger, 1991), in which Israeli Jews showed greater willingness to agree to certain compromise solutions derived directly from the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations when these solutions were presented as being offered by the Israeli delegation to the negotiations than when the *same* concessions were presented as being offered by the Palestinian delegation (Maoz et al., 2002).

On one level, the present study can be seen as continuing and expanding on these studies, demonstrating yet another type of framing that influences people's willingness to make concessions in an actual conflict. Thus, while the reactive devaluation studies have shown that the perception of a concession as originating from the opponent or from one's own side can affect our tendency to compromise, the present study shows how framing a concession in terms of exclusion ('What will you *not* concede?') versus inclusion ('What *will* you concede?') also influences people's willingness to make concessions in realistic conflict settings.

Moreover, while previous studies (Maoz et al., 2002, Maoz & McCauley, 2005) investigated people's willingness to agree to general compromise solutions such as the two-state solution (an independent Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel), the present study is the first one to investigate people's willingness to make concessions on specific, concrete territorial entities that have been under dispute. The Jewish settlements are among the most central and highly controversial issues involved in the dispute that also include the Palestinian right of return and the issue of Jerusalem, all of which have been hindering the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for decades.

Thus, where other studies show that framing and perceptual effects influence our willingness to agree to general, somewhat abstract, compromise solutions, this study shows that such effects can also operate when the concession involves a concrete core issue under dispute in the conflict, and when the extent of concession is directly quantifiable by number of assets (here, settlements) to be given up.

Limitations of the Study

Our study found that the inclusion-exclusion effect was on the order of 20 to 27%. The size of this effect is similar to what we found in earlier studies, such as the Yaniv et al. (2002) study, in which respondents were asked to predict which parties would be either included or excluded from the Israeli parliament after the coming elections.

In the present study, however, the classification of clear-cut and ambiguous items was less sharp than it was in the election study. The distinction between the ambiguous and clear-cut types was a matter of degree, rather than a sharp, qualitative difference. This is because, in the highly controversial situation in which the study was done, people were ambivalent to some extent about each and every settlement. The fate of the territories and the Jewish settlements is one of the most divisive issues within the Jewish-Israeli public (Bar-Tal, 2001; Shamir & Shamir, 2000). The Israeli climate of opinion is characterized by great ambivalence as to whether or not the settlements should be dismantled (Maoz & McCauley, 2005). Thus we could not find settlements about which there was complete consensus. The ones labeled as 'clear-cut' merely had a greater degree of consensus than those defined as 'ambiguous'.

Related to that is a concern regarding the level of measurement involved in our classification of settlements as ambiguous or clear-cut. Ambiguity was measured at the group level, thereby reflecting the level of consensus regarding the fate of each settlement across respondents. Ambiguity was applied however at the individual level. We assumed that settlements that showed group-level ambiguity tended also to be ambiguous in the respondents' minds. While this is largely a tenable assumption, it is also true that some individuals might hold clear opinions about a certain settlement about which the group consensus is low. Although we did find the expected interaction effect, whereby the framing effect was stronger for the settlements defined as ambiguous than for those defined as clear-cut, a subjective (rather than group level) indicator of ambiguity might have generated an even larger effect.

Practical Implications: Choosing the 'Right' Frame

Our study has other interesting practical implications. In the current phase of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where disengagement and the evacuation of Jewish settlements are the crux of Israeli political- decision making, our findings indicate frames of mind that can cause policy-makers and the public to be more or less willing to concede settlements.

When people who prefer not to concede settlements are faced with a decision on this issue, they may consciously or unconsciously choose an inclusion framing by asking 'Which settlements *am I willing* to concede?' thereby leading to the preferred end result of conceding few or no settlements. In contrast, people who believe that it is necessary to concede many settlements may

choose an exclusion framing by asking 'Which settlements *am I not willing* to concede?' The latter frame is more likely to lead (themselves or others) to concede many (or all) of the settlements.

Such framing can be also manipulated strategically by leaders, media sources, and pollsters, in attempts to affect public opinions in a preferred direction, such as when trying to influence the public to agree to a greater (or lesser) number of concessions. Future research might investigate this strategic use of the inclusion-exclusion effect, where preliminary attitudes towards concessions dictate the choice of the decision framing.

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