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Number  Authour(s)  Title  Date  Published in  Abstract  Paper 

4  Oscar Volij  Epistemic Conditions for Equilibrium in Beliefs without Independence  (01/1992)  Journal of Economic Theory 70 (1996), 391406 
Aumann and Brandenburger (1991) describe sufficient conditions on the knowledge of the players... 
dp4.pdf 
3  Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell  A NonCooperative Interpretation of Value and Potential  (01/1992)  In R. Selten (ed.) Rational Interaction (1992) SpringerVerlag 8393 
Given a (TU or NTU) game in characteristic form an auxiliary twoperson zero sum game is... 

2  Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell  Egalitarian Solutions of Large Games: II. The Asymptotic Approach  (01/1992)  Mathematics of Operations Research 20 (1995), 10031022 
This is the second of two papers developing the theory of Egalitarian solutions for games in... 

(03/2012) 
function of each player is bounded and continuous. We prove that in this class of games the... 

(03/2012) 
c model depends on (i) The way that experts' reputation affectscustomers' preferences, (ii) How... 

(03/2012) 
first uncountable ordinal, and that this bound is tight. Also, we examine the connection between... 

(03/2012) 
finite set of contracts. A solution concept  agreement  generalizes the notion of a stable... 

Elchanan BenPorath, Eddie Dekel, Barton L. Lipman  Disclosure and Choice  (02/2016) 
An agent chooses among projects with random outcomes. His payoff is increasing in the outcome... 
dp694.pdf 