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Number Authour(s) Title Date Published insort descending Abstract Paper
267 Gooni Orshan & Peter Sudholter Reconfirming the Prenucleolus (08/2001) Mathematics of Operations Research 28 (2003), 283-293

By means of an example it is shown that the prenucleolus is not the only minimal solution that...

41 Avishai Margalit The Ethics of Second-Order Beliefs (03/1994)

The questions I address my paper are: Are people morally responsible for their beliefs? Are...

143 Edna Ullmann-Margalit The Invisible Hand and the Cunning of Reason (05/1997) Social Research 64 (1997), 181-198

This paper traces the ideological career of the notion of the invisible hand, from the 18th...

347 Klaus Fiedler and Yaakov Kareev Does Decision Quality (Always) Increase with the Size of Information Samples? Some Vicissitudes in Applying the Law of Large Numbers (01/2004) Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition 32 (2006), 883-903

Adaptive decision-making requires that environmental contingencies between decision options and...

430 Maya Eden Optimal Ties in Contests (09/2006)

I analyze a mechanism design of a tournament in which the principal can strategically enhance...

313 Eyal Winter Incentives and Discrimination (05/2003) American Economic Review 94 (2003), 764-773

Optimal incentive mechanisms may require that agents are rewarded differentially even when they...

518 Robert J. Aumann Game Engineering (09/2009) Transcript of the lecture at Koźmiński University in Warsaw, Poland, May 14, 2008.

"Game Engineering" deals with the application of game theoretic methods to interactive...

9 Ezra Einy & Bezalel Peleg Coalition-Proof Communication Equilibria (07/1992) Social Choice Welfare and Ethics, W.A. Barnet, H. Moulin, M. Salles & N.J. Schofield (eds.), Cambridge University Press (1995), 289-300

We offer a definition of coalition-proof communication equilibria. The use of games of...

394 Noa Nitzan Tight Correlated Equilibrium (06/2005)

A correlated equilibrium of a strategic form n-person game is called tight if all the incentive...

110 Asher Wolinsky A Theory of the Firm with Non-Binding Employment Contracts (07/1996) Econometrica 68 (2000), 875-910.

This paper analyzes a dynamic model of a firm in which the wage of each employee is determined...

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