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Number Authour(s) Title Date Published in Abstract Paper
116 Olivier Gossner Comparison of Information Structures (09/1996) Games and Economic Behavior 30 (2000), 44-63.

We introduce two ways of comparing two information structures, say I and J. First, I is richer...

115 Dean P. Foster & H. Peyton Young Learning with Hazy Beliefs (09/1996) Published as: "Learning, Hypothesis Testing, and Nash Equilibrium", Games and Economic Behavior 25 (2003), 73-96.

Players are rational if they always choose best replies given their beliefs. They are good...

114 Abraham Neyman & Daijiro Okada Repeated Games with Bounded Entropy (09/1996) Games and Economic Behavior 30 (2000), 228-247.

We study the repeated games with a bound on strategic entropy (Neyman and Okada (1996)) of...

113 Ran El-Yaniv Is It Rational to Be Competitive? On the Decision-Theoretic Foundations of the Competitive Ratio (08/1996)

The competitive ratio, a performance measure for online algorithms, or alternatively, a decision...

112 Eitan Israeli Sowing Doubt Optimally in Two-Person Repeated Games (08/1996) Games and Economic Behavior 28 (1999), 203-216.

Consider a two-person repeated game (with complete information). Assume that one of the players...

111 Ran El-Yaniv Competitive Solutions for Online Financial Problems: A Survey (08/1996) ACM Computing Surveys 30 (1998), 28-69.

This paper surveys results concerning online algorithms for solving problems related to the...

110 Asher Wolinsky A Theory of the Firm with Non-Binding Employment Contracts (07/1996) Econometrica 68 (2000), 875-910.

This paper analyzes a dynamic model of a firm in which the wage of each employee is determined...

109 Robert J. Aumann A Note on the Centipede Game (06/1996) Games and Economic Behavior 23 (1998), 97-105

In Rosenthal's Centipede Game, if it is commonly known that the players choose rationally at...

108 Robert J. Aumann On the State of the Art in Game Theory (06/1996) Games and Economic Behavior 24 (1998), 181-210. Also in W. Albers, W. Guth, P. Hammerstein, B. Moldovanu & E. van Damme (eds.), Understanding Strategic Interaction, Essays in honor of R. Selten, (1996) Springer-Verlag 8-34

An interview conducted on June 30, 1995, which is to appear in the Selten Festschrift:...

107 Igal Milchtaich On Backward Induction Paths and Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria of Congestion Games (06/1996) Published as: "Crowding Games are Sequentially Solvable", International Journal of Game Theory 27 (1998), 501-509

In this note, a congestion game is a noncooperative normal-form game in which the players share...

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