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Number Authour(s) Title Date Published insort ascending Abstract Paper
289 Edna Ullmann-Margalit Trust Out of Distrust (05/2002) The Journal of Philosophy 99 (2002), 532-548

The paper aims to establish the possibility of trust from within a Hobbesian framework. It shows...

143 Edna Ullmann-Margalit The Invisible Hand and the Cunning of Reason (05/1997) Social Research 64 (1997), 181-198

This paper traces the ideological career of the notion of the invisible hand, from the 18th...

523 Ziv Hellman Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Repeated Cooperative Games (10/2009)

This paper is concerned with the question of extending the definition of the bargaining set, a...

224 Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell A Reinforcement Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium (08/2000) G. Debreu, W. Neuefeind & W. Trockel (eds.), Economic Essays: A Festschrift for Werner Hildenbrand, Springer (2001), 181-200

We consider repeated games where at any period each player knows only his set of actions and the...

340 Yaakov Kareev and Massimo Warglien Cognitive Overload and the Evaluation of Risky Alternatives: The Effects of Sample Size, Information Format and Attitude To Risk (10/2003)

When the amount of information to be dealt with exceeds people’s short-term memory capacity,...

489 Alon Harel and Tsvi Kahana The Easy Core Case for Judicial Review (09/2008)

This paper defends judicial review on the grounds that judicial review is necessary for...

27 Gary Bornstein & Roger Hurwitz Team Games as Models of Intergroup Conflicts (06/1993)

The internal problem of collective action that arises when groups, as opposed to individuals,...

256 Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudholter The Dummy Paradox of the Bargaining Set (06/2001) International Journal of Mathematics, Game Theory and Algebra, 12 (2002), 443-446. Also in L.A. Petrosjan & V.V. Mazalov (eds.) Game Theory and Applications, Vol. 8, Nova Science Publishers, New York (2002),119-124.

By means of an example of a superadditive 0-normalled game, we show that the maximum payoff to a...

387 R. J. Aumann and J. H. Dreze When All is Said and Done, How Should You Play and What Should You Expect? (03/2005) Published as "Rational Expectations in Games," American Economic Review 98 (2008), 72-86

Modern game theory was born in 1928, when John von Neumann published his Minimax Theorem. This...

110 Asher Wolinsky A Theory of the Firm with Non-Binding Employment Contracts (07/1996) Econometrica 68 (2000), 875-910.

This paper analyzes a dynamic model of a firm in which the wage of each employee is determined...

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