Publications

Advanced search

E.g., 15/08/2018
E.g., 15/08/2018
show/hide advanced search
Number Authour(s) Title Datesort descending Published in Abstract Paper
121 Yonatan Bilu, Tamar Keasar, Uzi Motro & Avi Shmida When Color Vision Is Not Useful: The Floral Choices of Foraging Bumblebees on Color-Polymorphic Artificial Flowers (11/1996) Israel Journal of Plant Sciences 45 (1997), 223-233

Naive bumblebees were allowed to forage on 30 color-polymorphic artificial flowers, which were...

123 Gershon Ben-Shakhar, Maya Bar-Hillel, Yoram Bilu, Gaby Shefler Seek and Ye Shall Find: Test Results Are What You Hypothesize They Are (11/1996) Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 11 (1998), 235-249

Expert clinicians were given batteries of psychodiagnostic test results (Rorshach, TAT, Drow-A-...

124 Sergiu Hart & Yair Tauman Market Crashes without External Shocks [Revised] (12/1996) Journal of Business 77 (2004), 1-8

It is shown here that market crashes and bubbles can arise without external shocks. Sudden...

125 Bezalel Peleg A Difficulty with Nash's Program: A Proof of a Special Case (12/1996) Economics Letters 55 (1997), 305-308

Let g be a cooperative game and let N be the set of players of g. According to Nash's Program N...

129 Peter Sudholter & Bezalel Peleg Nucleoli as Maximizers of Collective Satisfaction Functions (01/1997) Social Choice and Welfare 15 (1998), 383-411

Two preimputations of a given TU game can be compared via the Lorenz order applied to the...

126 Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium (01/1997) (revised in DP #166)

We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing a game. In this procedure, players depart...

127 Eilon Solan (Min Max)2=Min Max (01/1997)

A repeated game with absorbing states is played over the infinite future. A fixed one-shot game...

128 Eilon Solan 3-Person Repeated Games with Absorbing States (01/1997)

Every 3-person repeated game with absorbing states has an equilibrium payoff.

162 Abraham Neyman Cooperation in Repeated Games When the Number of Stages Is Not Commonly Known (revision of Discussion Paper #65) (01/1997) Econometrica 67 (1999), 45-64.
132 Bezalel Peleg Implementation of the Core of a Marriage Problem (02/1997)

We consider the prosaic system of matching which is specified by the following two common rules...

Pages