Publications

Advanced search

E.g., 20/08/2019
E.g., 20/08/2019
show/hide advanced search
Number Authour(s) Title Date Published insort ascending Abstract Paper
573 Shoham Choshen-Hillel and Ilan Yaniv Agency and the Construction of Social Preference: Between Inequality Aversion and Prosocial Behavior (05/2011) Forthcoming in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

The term “social preference” refers to decision makers’ satisfaction with their own outcomes and...

110 Asher Wolinsky A Theory of the Firm with Non-Binding Employment Contracts (07/1996) Econometrica 68 (2000), 875-910.

This paper analyzes a dynamic model of a firm in which the wage of each employee is determined...

452 Yuval Emek and Michal Feldman Computing an Optimal Contract in Simple Technologies (05/2007)

We study an economic setting in which a principal motivates a team of strategic agents to exert...

166 Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium (revision of Discussion Paper #126) (03/1998) Econometrica 68 (2000), 1127-1150

We propose a new and simple adaptive procedure for playing a game: " regretmatching." In this...

536 Robert J. Aumann The Role of Incentives in the World Financial Crisis (02/2010)

A lecture explaining the causes of the 2008‐9 world financial crisis in terms of ordinary...

6 Nathan Linial Games Computers Play: Game-Theoretic Aspects of Computing (02/1992) Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. II, R. J. Aumann & S. Hart (eds.), North-Holland (1994), 1340-1395

This is a survey of some connections between game theory and theoretical computer science. The...

295 Abraham Neyman Stochastic games: Existence of the MinMax (08/2002) In Stochastic Games and Applications, A. Neyman and S. Sorin (Eds.), Kluwer Academic Press (2003)
49 Eyal Winter Voting and Vetoing (06/1994) American Political Science Review 90 (1996), 813-823

The consequences of veto power in committees is analyzed using the approach of non-cooperative...

500 Gil Kalai How Quantum Computers Can Fail (01/2009)

We propose and discuss two postulates on the nature of errors in highly correlated noisy...

376 Bezalel Peleg and Peter Sudholter Bargaining Sets of Voting Games (12/2004) (revised in DP #410)

Let A be a finite set of m ≥ 3 alternatives, let N be a finite set of n ≥ 3 players and let Rn...

Pages