Publications
Advanced search
Number  Authour(s)  Title  Date  Published in  Abstract  Paper 

515  Tamar Keasar, Ally R. Harar, Guido Sabatinelli, Denis Keith, Amots Dafni, Ofrit Shavit, Assaph Zylbertal and Avi Shmida  Red Anemone Guild Flowers as Focal Places for Mating and Feeding of Mediterranean Glaphyrid Beetles  (07/2009) 
Several species of glaphyrid beetles forage and mate on Mediterranean red flowers. In red... 
dp515.pdf  
391  R. J. Aumann  Consciousness  (05/2005)  in Life as We Know It, edited by J. Seckbach, Springer (2006), 555564 
Consciousness is the last great frontier of science. Here we discuss what it is, how it differs... 
consciousness.pdf 
107  Igal Milchtaich  On Backward Induction Paths and Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria of Congestion Games  (06/1996)  Published as: "Crowding Games are Sequentially Solvable", International Journal of Game Theory 27 (1998), 501509 
In this note, a congestion game is a noncooperative normalform game in which the players share... 

481  Ehud Friedgut, Gil Kalai and Noam Nisan  Elections Can be Manipulated Often  (04/2008) 
The GibbardSatterthwaite theorem states that every nontrivial voting method between at least 3... 
dp481.pdf  
193  Oscar Volij  Utility Equivalence in Sealed Bid Auctions and the Dual Theory of Choice Under Risk  (03/1999) 
This paper analyzes symmetric, single item auctions in the private values framework, with buyers... 
dp193.pdf  
64  Jacob Glazer & Motty Perry  Virtual Implementation in Backwards Induction  (12/1994)  Games and Economic Behavior 15 (1996), 2732 
We examine a sequential mechanism which is a simple modification of the normal form mechanism... 
dp64.pdf 
(03/2012) 
c model depends on (i) The way that experts' reputation affectscustomers' preferences, (ii) How... 

280  Gil Kalai  A FourierTheoretic Perspective for the Condorcet Paradox and Arrow's Theorem  (11/2001)  Advances in Applied Mathematics 29 (2002), 412426 
We describe a Fouriertheoretic formula for the probability of rational outcomes for random... 
dp280.pdf 
156  Bezalel Peleg  Almost All Equilibria in Dominant Strategies are CoalitionProof  (09/1997)  Economics Letters 60 (1998), 157162 
Almost all equilibria in dominant strategies of finite strategic games are coalitionproof. 
dp156.pdf 
360  Bezalel Peleg and Peter Sudholter  On the NonEmptiness of the MasColell Bargaining Set  (05/2004)  Journal of Mathematical Economics 41 (2005), 10601068 
We introduce an extension of the MasColell bargaining set and construct, by an elabo ration on... 
dp360.pdf 