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Number Authour(s) Title Date Published insort descending Abstract Paper
515 Tamar Keasar, Ally R. Harar, Guido Sabatinelli, Denis Keith, Amots Dafni, Ofrit Shavit, Assaph Zylbertal and Avi Shmida Red Anemone Guild Flowers as Focal Places for Mating and Feeding of Mediterranean Glaphyrid Beetles (07/2009)

Several species of glaphyrid beetles forage and mate on Mediterranean red flowers. In red...

391 R. J. Aumann Consciousness (05/2005) in Life as We Know It, edited by J. Seckbach, Springer (2006), 555-564

Consciousness is the last great frontier of science. Here we discuss what it is, how it differs...

107 Igal Milchtaich On Backward Induction Paths and Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria of Congestion Games (06/1996) Published as: "Crowding Games are Sequentially Solvable", International Journal of Game Theory 27 (1998), 501-509

In this note, a congestion game is a noncooperative normal-form game in which the players share...

481 Ehud Friedgut, Gil Kalai and Noam Nisan Elections Can be Manipulated Often (04/2008)

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-trivial voting method between at least 3...

193 Oscar Volij Utility Equivalence in Sealed Bid Auctions and the Dual Theory of Choice Under Risk (03/1999)

This paper analyzes symmetric, single item auctions in the private values framework, with buyers...

64 Jacob Glazer & Motty Perry Virtual Implementation in Backwards Induction (12/1994) Games and Economic Behavior 15 (1996), 27-32

We examine a sequential mechanism which is a simple modification of the normal form mechanism...

(03/2012)

c model depends on (i) The way that experts' reputation affectscustomers' preferences, (ii) How...

280 Gil Kalai A Fourier-Theoretic Perspective for the Condorcet Paradox and Arrow's Theorem (11/2001) Advances in Applied Mathematics 29 (2002), 412-426

We describe a Fourier-theoretic formula for the probability of rational outcomes for random...

156 Bezalel Peleg Almost All Equilibria in Dominant Strategies are Coalition-Proof (09/1997) Economics Letters 60 (1998), 157-162

Almost all equilibria in dominant strategies of finite strategic games are coalition-proof.

360 Bezalel Peleg and Peter Sudholter On the Non-Emptiness of the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set (05/2004) Journal of Mathematical Economics 41 (2005), 1060-1068

We introduce an extension of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and construct, by an elabo- ration on...

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