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Number  Authour(s)  Title  Date  Published in  Abstract  Paper 

10  Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell  A Model of nPerson NonCooperative Bargaining  (07/1992)  Pubslied as "Bargaining and Value" in Econometrica 64 (1996), 357380 
We present and analyze a model of noncooperative bargaining among n participants, applied to... 

9  Ezra Einy & Bezalel Peleg  CoalitionProof Communication Equilibria  (07/1992)  Social Choice Welfare and Ethics, W.A. Barnet, H. Moulin, M. Salles & N.J. Schofield (eds.), Cambridge University Press (1995), 289300 
We offer a definition of coalitionproof communication equilibria. The use of games of... 

8  Sergiu Hart  On Prize Games  (05/1992)  Essays in Game Theory, N. Megiddo (ed.), SpringerVerlag (1994), 111121 
We consider the class of hyperplane coalition games (Hgames): the feasible set of each... 

7  Eyal Winter  Mechanism Robustness in Multilateral Bargaining  (03/1992)  Theory and Decision 40 (1996), 131147 
We describe a noncooperative bargaining model for games in coalition form without transferable... 

5  JoseLuis Ferreira, Itzhak Gilboa, Michael Maschler  Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing during the Play  (02/1992)  Games and Economic Behavior 10 (1995), 284317 
Whenever one deals with an interactive decision situation of long duration, one has to take into... 
dp5.pdf 
6  Nathan Linial  Games Computers Play: GameTheoretic Aspects of Computing  (02/1992)  Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. II, R. J. Aumann & S. Hart (eds.), NorthHolland (1994), 13401395 
This is a survey of some connections between game theory and theoretical computer science. The... 

2  Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell  Egalitarian Solutions of Large Games: II. The Asymptotic Approach  (01/1992)  Mathematics of Operations Research 20 (1995), 10031022 
This is the second of two papers developing the theory of Egalitarian solutions for games in... 

4  Oscar Volij  Epistemic Conditions for Equilibrium in Beliefs without Independence  (01/1992)  Journal of Economic Theory 70 (1996), 391406 
Aumann and Brandenburger (1991) describe sufficient conditions on the knowledge of the players... 
dp4.pdf 
3  Sergiu Hart & Andreu MasColell  A NonCooperative Interpretation of Value and Potential  (01/1992)  In R. Selten (ed.) Rational Interaction (1992) SpringerVerlag 8393 
Given a (TU or NTU) game in characteristic form an auxiliary twoperson zero sum game is... 