Publications
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| Number | Authour(s) | Title |
Date |
Published in | Abstract | Paper |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 119 | Tamar Keasar, Uzi Motro & Avi Shmida | Exploration Effort in Foraging Bees Is Enhanced by Clustering of Food Resources | (11/1996) |
Foraging can be viewed as a dual activity: a food-collection process, and an exploration process... |
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| 118 | Tamar Keasar, Uzi Motro & Avi Shmida | Foraging as an Exploratory Activity in Bees: The Effect of Patch Variability | (11/1996) |
Foraging can be viewed as a dual activity: a food-collection process, and an exploration process... |
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| 124 | Sergiu Hart & Yair Tauman | Market Crashes without External Shocks [Revised] | (12/1996) | Journal of Business 77 (2004), 1-8 |
It is shown here that market crashes and bubbles can arise without external shocks. Sudden... |
 crash.html |
| 125 | Bezalel Peleg | A Difficulty with Nash's Program: A Proof of a Special Case | (12/1996) | Economics Letters 55 (1997), 305-308 |
Let g be a cooperative game and let N be the set of players of g. According to Nash's Program N... |
 dp125.pdf |
| 162 | Abraham Neyman | Cooperation in Repeated Games When the Number of Stages Is Not Commonly Known (revision of Discussion Paper #65) | (01/1997) | Econometrica 67 (1999), 45-64. | ||
| 129 | Peter Sudholter & Bezalel Peleg | Nucleoli as Maximizers of Collective Satisfaction Functions | (01/1997) | Social Choice and Welfare 15 (1998), 383-411 |
Two preimputations of a given TU game can be compared via the Lorenz order applied to the... |
dp129.pdf |
| 126 | Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell | A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium | (01/1997) | (revised in DP #166) |
We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing a game. In this procedure, players depart... |
adapt.html |
| 127 | Eilon Solan | (Min Max)2=Min Max | (01/1997) |
A repeated game with absorbing states is played over the infinite future. A fixed one-shot game... |
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| 128 | Eilon Solan | 3-Person Repeated Games with Absorbing States | (01/1997) |
Every 3-person repeated game with absorbing states has an equilibrium payoff. |
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| 132 | Bezalel Peleg | Implementation of the Core of a Marriage Problem | (02/1997) |
We consider the prosaic system of matching which is specified by the following two common rules... |
