|2||Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell||Egalitarian Solutions of Large Games: II. The Asymptotic Approach||(01/1992)||Mathematics of Operations Research 20 (1995), 1003-1022||
This is the second of two papers developing the theory of Egalitarian solutions for games in...
|4||Oscar Volij||Epistemic Conditions for Equilibrium in Beliefs without Independence||(01/1992)||Journal of Economic Theory 70 (1996), 391-406||
Aumann and Brandenburger (1991) describe sufficient conditions on the knowledge of the players...
|3||Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell||A Non-Cooperative Interpretation of Value and Potential||(01/1992)||In R. Selten (ed.) Rational Interaction (1992) Springer-Verlag 83-93||
Given a (TU or NTU) game in characteristic form an auxiliary two-person zero sum game is...
|6||Nathan Linial||Games Computers Play: Game-Theoretic Aspects of Computing||(02/1992)||Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. II, R. J. Aumann & S. Hart (eds.), North-Holland (1994), 1340-1395||
This is a survey of some connections between game theory and theoretical computer science. The...
|5||Jose-Luis Ferreira, Itzhak Gilboa, Michael Maschler||Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing during the Play||(02/1992)||Games and Economic Behavior 10 (1995), 284-317||
Whenever one deals with an interactive decision situation of long duration, one has to take...
|7||Eyal Winter||Mechanism Robustness in Multilateral Bargaining||(03/1992)||Theory and Decision 40 (1996), 131-147||
We describe a non-cooperative bargaining model for games in coalition form without transferable...
|8||Sergiu Hart||On Prize Games||(05/1992)||Essays in Game Theory, N. Megiddo (ed.), Springer-Verlag (1994), 111-121||
We consider the class of hyperplane coalition games (H-games): the feasible set of each...
|10||Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell||A Model of n-Person Non-Cooperative Bargaining||(07/1992)||Pubslied as "Bargaining and Value" in Econometrica 64 (1996), 357-380||
We present and analyze a model of non-cooperative bargaining among n participants, applied to...
|9||Ezra Einy & Bezalel Peleg||Coalition-Proof Communication Equilibria||(07/1992)||Social Choice Welfare and Ethics, W.A. Barnet, H. Moulin, M. Salles & N.J. Schofield (eds.), Cambridge University Press (1995), 289-300||
We offer a definition of coalition-proof communication equilibria. The use of games of...
|11||Avi Shmida & Bezalel Peleg||Strict and Symmetric Correlated Equilibria Are the Distributions of the ESS's of Biological Conflicts with Asymmetric Roles||(08/1992)||In W. Albers, W. Guth, P. Hammerstein, B. Moldovanu & E. van Damme (eds.), Understanding Strategic Interaction, Essays in Honor of R. Selten, (1997) Springer-Verlag 149-170||
We investigate the ESS's of payoff-irrelevant asymmetric animal conflicts in Selten's (1980)...