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Home > EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGIESOF RANDOM GAMES, AND THE VERTICES OF RANDOM POLYGONS (JOINT WORK WITH YOSEF RINOTT)

EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGIESOF RANDOM GAMES, AND THE VERTICES OF RANDOM POLYGONS (JOINT WORK WITH YOSEF RINOTT)

Abstract: An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), a concept introduced by Maynard-Smith and Price (1973), is a strategy that is immune to invasions by rare alternative ("mutant") strategies. Does an ESS always exist? No: there are finite games with no ESS (unlike Nash equilibria, which always exist in this case). How robust is this non-existence phenomenon? In particular, does an ESS exist for almost every game?Next, consider the convex hull of n random points in the plane. How many vertices are there? This is a classical problem, originally studied by Renyi and Sulanke (1963).We analyze these two problems and get some surprising results, having to do with the underlying "random" distribution.

Location: 
Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus
Dates: 
Sunday, December 31, 2006 - 16:15 to 18:15
Old Lecturers: 
SERGIU HART and BENJAMIN WEISS
Old Lecturers University: 
The Hebrew University

Source URL: http://www.ratio.huji.ac.il/node/1473?page=119