Preferences, Beliefs, and Strategic Plays in Games (joint work with Rudolf Kerschbamer, Jianying Qiu

We examine strategic plays in games while controlling for distributional preferences and beliefs. We elicit players' distributional preferences before they play a series of two-person strategic games. We also elicit players' belief about the opponent's strategies. Our control of distributional preferences does not rely on any particular parametric forms; it is rather based on revealed preferences. The payoff vectors in strategic games are the same as the payoff vectors in the distributional preferencestask.

Kenneth Arrow


It is with great sadness that we have learned of the passing of a dear friend of our Center. Ken Arrow passed away on February 21, 2017. Ken not only was the most admired economist in the modern era but also played a key role at the Center. He was the founding director of the summer school and has been on the academic committee of the Center from its inception 26 years ago. He visited the Center almost every summer including the last one. His presence at our Center will always be felt and he will be greatly missed.


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