Structural Robustness of Large Games

 ABSTRACTThis short survey (forthcoming in the new Palgrave Dictionary of economics)discusses recent findings on the robustness of Nash equilibria of strategicgames with many semi anonymous players.  It describes the notion ofstructural robustness and its general consequences , as well as implicationsto particular games such as ones played on the web and market games. 

EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGIESOF RANDOM GAMES, AND THE VERTICES OF RANDOM POLYGONS (JOINT WORK WITH YOSEF RINOTT)

Abstract: An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), a concept introduced by Maynard-Smith and Price (1973), is a strategy that is immune to invasions by rare alternative ("mutant") strategies. Does an ESS always exist? No: there are finite games with no ESS (unlike Nash equilibria, which always exist in this case). How robust is this non-existence phenomenon? In particular, does an ESS exist for almost every game?Next, consider the convex hull of n random points in the plane. How many vertices are there?

EVOLUTION AND INFORMATION

Abstract: What is a signal worth, how much information does it carry? The notions of entropy and mutual information have not made it into mainstream biology. Instead, the value of signals is measured in more tangible currency, such as number of offspring or fitness. In this talk I will show that the notion of biological fitness, or growth rate, and measures of information are tightly linked. I will then explore the information content of the genome. How does information enter the genome, and what benefit can it give once it is there?

SIMPLE FORAGING FOR SIMPLE FORAGERS (joint work with Bezalel Peleg, Mor Amita and Avi Shmida)

Abstract: We try to explain how solitary bees (as examples of simple foragers), without any communication, will distribute themselves in a field of flowers according to something known as the Ideal Free Distribution, while any individual exhibits the so-called Matching Law when alone. We discuss two types of simple foraging strategies. Each of these strategies explains the appearance of the Ideal Free Distribution in a multi-bee community as well as as the Matching Law in an experimental set-up.

MODELS OF ORDER IN KABBALAH

Abstract:The lecture will deal with the ascent of the importance of objective order in medievalJudaism, in comparison to earlier forms of Judaism, and I will address forms of order like astronomical, theosophical, intellectual, and linguistic order.

MAKING RETIREMENT DECISIONS WITHOUT ELICITING UTILITIES (JOINT WITH S. KAKADE AND O. RONEN)

Abstract:We study the problem of how one should invest for retirement.Typically before this problem can be solved, a detailed utilityfunction needs to be elicited: the utility for consumption, thedis-utility for working, the utility for passing on inheritance, thediscount factor to trade-off utilities at different times, etc.  Oncethese are all known, backwards induction solves the problem.  But,people are notoriously bad at making these judgments.  So can we offeradvice which doesn't depend on knowing their utility?This talk will present some simple stylized facts that are useful inmaking

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