RATIONALITY IN THE COUNCIL FOR MEDICATIONS AND TECHNOLOGIES, MANDATE AND DELIBERATIONS

Abstract:First, we discuss paradoxes and difficulties in Utilitarian Ethics, especially applied to medical practice and services [Also refer to Mishna, Pirkey Avot bet]. "Cut from A and give to B" is a major difficulty. But as a guide to allocate incremental resources, utilitarian Ethics is unsurpassed: To reduce inequalities, close gaps, maximize cost-benefits.Our main concern is- the national public health basket.Choosing an appropriate measure- say "health years" is important.

ON THE CONFLICT OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST (THE LECTURE WILL BE IN HEBREW)

Abstract:During the last 25 years the Supreme Court acquitted public employees (elected or appointed) from corruption related offenses (bribery and/or breach of public trust) one after the other. These acquittals were (and still are) perceived, both by the Court and the prosecution, as evidence based acquittals. Usually, the Court reasoned its decisions by pointing at some lack of evidence with regard to the mental element of the offence. I would like to suggest a different reading of these cases.

AN ECONOMIC INDEX OF RISKINESS (joint work with Roberto Serrano)

Abstract: On March 21, 2004, an article on the front page of the New York Timespresented a picture of allegedly questionable practices in some state-runpension funds. Among the allegations were that these funds often makeunduly risky investments, recommended by consultants who are interestedparties. The concept of "risky investment" is commonplace in financialdiscussions, and seems to have clear conceptual content. But when onethinks about it carefully and tries to pin it down, it is elusive.

n-PLAYER STOCHASTIC GAMES WITH ADDITIVE TRANSITIONS

Abstract: An n-player stochastic game can be seen as a finite collection of n-dimensional matrix games that are being played, one at a time, in an infinite sequence of discrete stages. At each stage the players, who are assumed to have complete information and perfect recall, independently choose their actions. This joint action determines a payoff to each of the players, as well as a transition probability vector according to which the next matrix game will be selected. Here we assume the transitions to be additive (AT), i.e.

COMPLEXITY AND EFFECTIVE PREDICTION (JOINT WORK WITH JOEL SPENCER)

Abstract: Let G = (I,J,g) be a two-person zero-sum game. We examine the two-person zero-sum repeated game G(k,m) in which player 1 and 2 place down finite state automata with k,m states respectively and the payoff is the average per stage payoff when the two automata face off. We are interested in the cases in which player 1 is "smart" in the sense that k is large but player 2 is "much smarter" in the sense that m>>k. Let S(g) be the value of G were the second player is clairvoyant, i.e., would know the player 1's move in advance.

STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF TERRORISM (Joint work with Professor Eva Carceles Poveda)

Abstract: We study a strategic game between a terror organization and a number ofcountries. The countries can differ in the political or economic power, theeffectiveness in fighting the terrorist in its base and the effectiveness inprotecting their soil against terror attacks. In addition, they can differin their vulnerability to terror attacks and the damage it causes as well asin the benefit they obtain from cooperating with each other in the waragainst terror. We first study a static two stage game analytically.

ALL-PAY CONTESTS

Abstract:  The paper studies a new class of games, "All-Pay Contests", which capture general asymmetries and sunk investments inherent in scenarios such as lobbying, competition for market power, labor-market tournaments, and R&D races. Players have continuous, non-decreasing cost functions and compete for one of several identical prizes. This allows for differing production technologies, costs of capital, and prior investments, among others.

Discrete Colonel Blotto And General Lotto Games

Abstract: A class of integer-valued allocation games -- "General Lotto games" -- is introduced and solved. The results are then applied to analyze the classical discrete "Colonel Blotto games"; in particular,optimal strategies are obtained for all symmetric Colonel Blotto games.http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart/abs/blotto.html

Structural Robustness of Large Games

 ABSTRACTThis short survey (forthcoming in the new Palgrave Dictionary of economics)discusses recent findings on the robustness of Nash equilibria of strategicgames with many semi anonymous players.  It describes the notion ofstructural robustness and its general consequences , as well as implicationsto particular games such as ones played on the web and market games. 

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