ALL-PAY CONTESTS

Abstract:  The paper studies a new class of games, "All-Pay Contests", which capture general asymmetries and sunk investments inherent in scenarios such as lobbying, competition for market power, labor-market tournaments, and R&D races. Players have continuous, non-decreasing cost functions and compete for one of several identical prizes. This allows for differing production technologies, costs of capital, and prior investments, among others.

Discrete Colonel Blotto And General Lotto Games

Abstract: A class of integer-valued allocation games -- "General Lotto games" -- is introduced and solved. The results are then applied to analyze the classical discrete "Colonel Blotto games"; in particular,optimal strategies are obtained for all symmetric Colonel Blotto games.http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart/abs/blotto.html

Structural Robustness of Large Games

 ABSTRACTThis short survey (forthcoming in the new Palgrave Dictionary of economics)discusses recent findings on the robustness of Nash equilibria of strategicgames with many semi anonymous players.  It describes the notion ofstructural robustness and its general consequences , as well as implicationsto particular games such as ones played on the web and market games. 

EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGIESOF RANDOM GAMES, AND THE VERTICES OF RANDOM POLYGONS (JOINT WORK WITH YOSEF RINOTT)

Abstract: An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), a concept introduced by Maynard-Smith and Price (1973), is a strategy that is immune to invasions by rare alternative ("mutant") strategies. Does an ESS always exist? No: there are finite games with no ESS (unlike Nash equilibria, which always exist in this case). How robust is this non-existence phenomenon? In particular, does an ESS exist for almost every game?Next, consider the convex hull of n random points in the plane. How many vertices are there?

EVOLUTION AND INFORMATION

Abstract: What is a signal worth, how much information does it carry? The notions of entropy and mutual information have not made it into mainstream biology. Instead, the value of signals is measured in more tangible currency, such as number of offspring or fitness. In this talk I will show that the notion of biological fitness, or growth rate, and measures of information are tightly linked. I will then explore the information content of the genome. How does information enter the genome, and what benefit can it give once it is there?

SIMPLE FORAGING FOR SIMPLE FORAGERS (joint work with Bezalel Peleg, Mor Amita and Avi Shmida)

Abstract: We try to explain how solitary bees (as examples of simple foragers), without any communication, will distribute themselves in a field of flowers according to something known as the Ideal Free Distribution, while any individual exhibits the so-called Matching Law when alone. We discuss two types of simple foraging strategies. Each of these strategies explains the appearance of the Ideal Free Distribution in a multi-bee community as well as as the Matching Law in an experimental set-up.

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