The Perfect Folk Theorem for Continuous-time Repeated Games

Location: 
Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus
Dates: 
Sunday, November 10, 2019 - 14:00 to 16:00
Lecturers: 
Abraham Neyman
HUJI
Abstract: 

Abstract:It is proved that the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of a continuous-time finite- or infinite-horizon repeated game is convex and includes any subgame perfect equilibrium payoff of the discounted discrete-time infinitely repeated game.In contrast to previous studies of continuous-time games, where the set of strategies is confined to those who define unambiguously a play of the game, our results applies to the most general concept of a strategy in a continuous-time game.The result implies that any feasible payoff of the single-stage game that is strictly above the individual rational payoff is a subgame perfect equilibrium payoff of the continuous-time repeated game, whenever the set of feasible payoffs of the n-person game has full dimensionality or n=2.   Refreshments available at 1:30 p.m.