Individual Rights and Collective Responsibility: The Rights-Egalitarian Solution

Authors: 
Carmen Herrero, Michael Maschler & Antonio Villar
Abstract: 

The problem of distributing a given amount of a divisible good among a set of agents which may have individual entitlements is considered here. A solution tothis problem, called the Rights-Egalitarian Solution, is proposed. This allocation rule divides equally among the agents the difference between the aggregate entitlements and the amount of that good available. A relevant feature of the analysis developed is that no sign restriction is established on the parameters of the model (that is, the aggregate entitlements may exceed or fall short of the amount of the good, agents' rights may be positive or negative, the allocation may involve a redistribution of agents' holdings, etc.). Several characterizations are provided, and its game theoretic properties are analyzed.

Date: 
June, 1996
Published in: 
Mathematical Social Sciences 37 (1999), 59-77.
Number: 
106