Ternary Voting Games

Authors: 
Dan S. Felsenthal
Moshe Machover
Abstract: 

We define ternary voting games (TVGs), a generalization of simple voting games (SVGs). In a play of an SVG each voter has just two options: voting `yes' or `no'. In a TVG a third option is added: abstention. Every SVG can be regarded as a (somewhat degenerate) TVG; but the converse is false. We define appropriate generalizations of the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices for TVGs. We define also the responsiveness (or degree of democratic participation) of a TVG and determine, for each n, the most responsive TVGs with n voters. We show that these maximally responsive TVGs are more responsive than the corresponding SVGs.

Date: 
February, 1996
Published in: 
International Journal of Game Theory 26 (1997), 335-351
Number: 
98