Incomplete Information Games and the Normal Distribution

Authors: 
Jean-Francois Mertens & Shmuel Zamir
Abstract: 

We consider a repeated two-person zero-sum game in which the payoffs in the stage game are given by a 2 % 2 matrix. This is chosen (once) by chance, at the beginning of the game, to be either G1 or G², with probabilities p and 1 - p respectively. The maximizer is informed of the actual payoff matrix chosen but the minimizer is not. Denote by vn(p) the value of the n -times repeated game (with the payoff function defined as the average payoff per stage), and by v%(p) the value of the infinitely repeated game. It is proved that vn(p)=v%(p) + %(p)%(p)/%n + %%1/%n% , where %(p) is on appropriately scaled normal distributiondensity function evaluated at its p-quantile, and the coefficient K(p) is either 0 or the absolute value of a linear function in p.

Date: 
February, 1995
Published in: 
Number: 
70