The Partnered Core of a Game with Side Payments

Authors: 
Philip J. Reny, Eyal Winter & Myrna Holtz Wooders
Abstract: 

We introduce the notion of the partnered core of a game. A payoff is partnered if there are no asymmetric dependencies between any two players. A payoff is in the partnered core of a game if it is partnered, feasible and cannot be improved upon by any coalition of players. We show that the relative interior of the core of a game with side payments is contained in the partnered core. For quasi-strictly convex games the partnered core coincides with the relative interior of the core. When there are no more than three partnerships, the sums of the payoffs to partnerships are constant across all core payoffs. When there are no more than three players, the partner core satisfies additional properties.

Date: 
September, 1993
Published in: 
Number: 
33