MIXED BUNDLING AUCTIONS

Abstract: We study multi-object auctions where agents have multi-dimensional, private and additive valuations for heterogeneous objects. The revenue-maximizing auction for such environments is not known. I will first explain the relevant economic ideas / relations to monopoly pricing, and then the technical difficulties appearing in the auction context.  I will then focus on the revenue properties of a class of dominant strategy mechanisms where a weight is assigned to each partition of objects. The weights influence the probability with which partitions are chosen in the mechanism. This class contains efficient auctions, pure bundling auctions, mixed bundling auctions, auctions with reserve prices, and auctions with pre-packaged bundles. For any number of objects and bidders, we show that both the pure bundling auction and separate, efficient auctions for the single objects are revenue-inferior to an auction that involves mixed bundling.

Location: 
Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus
Dates: 
Sunday, January 7, 2007 - 16:15 to 18:15
Old Lecturers: 
BENNY MOLDOVANU
Old Lecturers University: 
UNIVERSITY OF BONN