Optimal Use of Communication Resources with Partial Monitoring

Abstract:Communication enables players to exchange information and thus bridge the optimality gap resulting from asymmetric information. However, when communication is costly, e.g., when restricted to moves in a game, the tradeoff between the benefits of transmitting information and its cost needs a delicate analysis.The optimal use of communication resources is solved in the model of a repeated game where only one player is informed of the sequence of temporal states of nature and in the course of the play the other players observe only the actions of the informed player (they are unable to observe the states of nature). Surprisingly, the same average payoffs are achievable whether the states of nature are observable by other players or not.The result is demonstrated using the concept of hypergraph coloring and the probabilistic method as well as information theoretic tools.

Location: 
Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus
Dates: 
Sunday, November 25, 2007 - 16:15 to 18:15
Old Lecturers: 
Ilya Khayutin
Old Lecturers University: 
The Hebrew University