PROGRAMS AND MEDIATORS (JOINT WORK WITH ITAI ASHLAGI, DOV MONDERER)

Abstract: This talk is a brief introduction to our work on program equilibrium and mediated equilibrium. We show that when agents'strategies are computer programs which are executed on a given computing device, one can exploit the Von-Neumann dual role of computer programs.We show that this idea implies that the set of program equilibrium payoffs of a game coincides with the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs of it.Computers which run such computer programs can be seen as action mediators, who can act on behalf of agents based on their instructions.We develop a theory of action mediators and show that they significantly enrich the set of situations where we can obtain stability against correlated deviations by coalitions. Moreover, we introduce the study of routing mediators, in which the above mediators may possess information also about the behavior of agents who do not give the mediator the right of play. We study the relationships between the power of different routing mediators in establishing correlated strong equilibrium. We show a natural class of routing mediators that allow to implement fair and efficient outcomes as a correlated super-strong equilibrium in a wide class of games.Finally, we briefly discuss the use of mediators in pre-Bayesian games, and in particular in the context of position auctions

Location: 
Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus
Dates: 
Sunday, April 15, 2007 - 16:15 to 18:15
Old Lecturers: 
MOSHE TENNENHOLTZ
Old Lecturers University: 
TECHNION