PARTIALLY-SPECIFIED PROBABILITIES: DECISIONS AND GAMES

Abstract: In the Ellsberg paradox decision makers who are only partially informed about the actualprobability distribution violate the expected utility paradigm. The paper takes an axiomatic approach using Anscombe-Aumann's setting, and introduces a theory of decision making with a partially specified probabilities.       Partially-specified decision making is then extended to games in order to introduce partially-specified equilibrium and partially-specified correlated equilibrium. If time allows, the issue of learning to play partially-specified correlated equilibrium will be also discussed.

Location: 
Elath Hall, 2nd floor, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus
Dates: 
Sunday, March 11, 2007 - 16:15 to 18:15
Old Lecturers: 
EHUD LEHRER
Old Lecturers University: 
TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY